



Chinese views of the world at the time of the Russia-Ukraine war

Evidence from a March 2022 public opinion survey

Richard Q. Turcsányi | Klára Dubravčíková | Kristína Kironská
Tao Wang | James Iocovozzi | Peter Gries
Veronika Vaseková | Andrew Chubb



CEIAS
Central European Institute
of Asian Studies



Sinofon



Chinese views of the world at the time of the Russia-Ukraine war

Evidence from a March 2022 public opinion survey

Authors: Richard Q. Turcsányi | Klára Dubravčíková | Kristína Kironská | Tao Wang | James Iocovozzi | Peter Gries | Veronika Vaseková | Andrew Chubb

Published by Palacky University Press and CEIAS (2022).

Funding: This work was supported by European Regional Development Fund Project "Sinophone Borderlands – Interaction at the Edges", CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000791.

Suggested citation: Turcsanyi, Richard Q., Klara Dubravcikova, Kristina Kironska, Tao Wang, James Iocovozzi, Peter Gries, Veronika Vasekova, Andrew Chubb (2022): *Chinese views of the world at the time of the Russia-Ukraine war. Evidence from a March 2022 public opinion survey*, Palacky University Olomouc and CEIAS. ISBN: 978-80-8239-007-3.

The word cloud on the title page shows first associations of Chinese respondents with the US (see also *Figure 8*).

Contents

Introduction	3
Views of foreign countries	4
Mirrored attitudes: if I like you, you like me	9
First associations with Russia and the US	11
Faces of Chinese attitudes towards main powers	13
Covid-19 vaccines and diplomacy	15
Perceived distribution of power	16
Foreign policy preferences	20
Views of Chinese people	22
Endnotes	23
About authors	26
About CEIAS	27
About Sinophone Borderlands	28

Introduction

This report is a result of a **large-scale online survey¹ of public opinion in Mainland China,²** conducted between 9-23 March 2022,³ with a research sample (N=3039) representative of the Chinese population with respect to gender, age (18-65 years), and country region.⁴ This survey is part of a broader research project ‘Sinophone Borderlands – Interaction at the Edges’, funded by the European Regional Development Fund.⁵ As part of this project, a series of public opinion surveys have been conducted in various parts of the world.⁶ We sum up some of the findings from the Mainland China survey here, especially in relation to **Chinese views of Russia, the US, and international affairs**. More outcomes from this research project will follow in future, focusing on a number of more concrete issues.


Overall, Chinese respondents expressed **very positive views of Russia** and **very negative views of the US**. In fact, of the 25 countries respondents were asked about, **Russia was the most positively perceived country**, while the **US was the most negatively perceived**. As our survey was collected at the height of the Chinese public and media attention towards the Russia-Ukraine war (and before the escalation of the Covid-19 in China in late March), these results suggest that the **Chinese public was not disturbed by the Russian aggression, and even appeared to support Russia**.

This is consistent with available qualitative studies of Chinese official and social media, which show how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been portrayed not as an act of unprovoked aggression against a sovereign nation, but as a rightful response to US and NATO’s “bullying” of Russia. Russia appears to be strongly supported in resisting what is redefined as American aggression.⁷

1 Views of foreign countries


Russia turned out to be the most positively perceived country by the Chinese respondents (see *Figure 1*). Asked to rate their feelings toward 25 countries on a scale of 0-100, 79.8% of respondents said they viewed Russia in a positive light while only 12% held negative views. It seems clear, then, that **Chinese positive attitudes towards Russia were not disturbed by the Russia-Ukraine war**. Quite the opposite, as *Figure 2* shows, almost 80% of respondents reported that their views of Russia had improved over the last three years.⁸ This finding is broadly consistent with past survey results between 2008 and 2015, which found only around 50% of Chinese respondents held positive views of Russia.⁹

Figure 1: How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries?¹⁰



When asked to provide reasons for the change in their sentiments, respondents whose perception of Russia improved mentioned the strength of the country and the leadership ("trust Putin," "Putin has guts," "strong leadership"), as well as trustworthiness and friendliness towards China ("brotherly love" between Russia and China and also "enemy of an enemy is our friend"). Respondents also referred to economic development and military strength, with the term "warrior nation", used in a positive sense ("famous warrior nation"). A few answers referred to the admiration of beautiful women and athletes (mostly skaters) and a good life in general. Those few who said their opinion on Russia worsened said the Russian economy was bad or in decline, mentioned wars, war with Ukraine, and invading other countries.

Figure 2: Has your general view of Russia got better or worse during the last three years?¹¹



The **US was the most negatively viewed country in China** with slightly more than 60% of respondents perceiving it negatively and 31% holding positive attitudes. India was the second-most poorly evaluated country, with nearly 58% negative views, followed by Japan with 55%. *Figure 3* also suggests that **perceptions of the US have significantly deteriorated** recently: almost 60% of the Chinese respondents stated their perception of the US had worsened over the past three years. Interestingly, in the case of Japan, about the same proportion of respondents (36% in both cases) reported that their views had improved and worsened over the same time period (see

Figure 4). Given that the Chinese public usually views Japan the most negatively,¹² these findings confirm that the image of the US has indeed worsened.

Figure 3: Has your general view of the United States got better or worse during the last three years?¹³






Figure 4: Has your general view of Japan got better or worse during the last three years?¹⁴



When asked to explain why the respondents' views of the US had changed, the common reasons included the mismanagement of the Covid-19 crisis by the US government, American hegemony and the tendency of the US to "instigate wars" and "meddle in other countries' affairs." Particularly common adjectives included "bossy," "arrogant," "selfish," "shameless," "unfriendly," "retarded," and "vicious." Besides, economic conflicts such as the China-US trade war and the general perception of suppression held among Chinese citizens have also played a role in the deterioration of the respondent's views on America. Respondents who saw positive changes in their perceptions of the US listed mostly economic reasons as well as advanced technology.

The other very positively perceived countries among Chinese respondents were **Pakistan (73%), Singapore (66%), North Korea (62%), and Germany (61%)**. In turn, other very negatively perceived countries included **India (56%), Japan (54%), Vietnam (48%), South Korea (47%) and Ukraine (46%)**.¹⁵ Few if any previously published polls have asked Chinese respondents their views of Ukraine, but prior to Russia's invasion, Ukrainian opinion appears to have been far more positive towards China than the reverse.¹⁶

Figure 5: How positively or negatively do you assess the foreign policy of the following countries/entities?




As suggested by the previous *Figure 1*, bilateral relationships seem to be an important factor driving the attitudes of the Chinese toward foreign countries. When asked about their assessment of the foreign policy of selected great powers, **Chinese respondents assessed their own country's foreign policy most positively, followed by Russia** which was also

assessed as decisively positive by slightly more than 73% of the respondents overall (*Figure 5*). The foreign policies of **other great powers were seen predominantly negatively**, suggesting the perception of a clear division between China and Russia on the one side, facing the US, EU, Japan, and India, on the other. These findings again indicate that many Chinese respondents indeed support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The results also suggest that when the Chinese look around, they see a relatively hostile international environment in which Russia is the sole great power standing with China and opposing the US.

2 Mirrored attitudes: if I like you, you like me

In general, Chinese **respondents' views of foreign countries correspond closely with their perceptions of those countries' views of China**. More than 60% view the United States negatively (see *Figure 1*), while a nearly identical proportion indicated they believed the US viewed China negatively (see *Figure 6*). The same pattern is evident in Chinese views of Japan and India. Notably, France and Germany are assessed positively by 55% to 60% of Chinese respondents as *Figure 1* indicates, and in turn, are perceived by similar proportions as holding similarly positive views towards China. In reality, as was found previously, Chinese respondents are **too optimistic in their estimates of how China is perceived in Europe**: significant majorities of Germans and French hold negative views.¹⁷


Figure 6: How do you think China is viewed in the following countries?¹⁸



We also asked respondents about the degree of cultural difference they perceive between foreign countries and China. **Singapore and North Korea were perceived as similar to China by approximately 56% and 55% of respondents respectively**, ahead of Russia (47%), South Korea (45%), Japan

(45%), and Vietnam (40%). **The US and India were seen as dissimilar to China by 64% and 58% of respondents.** The findings show that respondents do identify some common cultural features even with countries they otherwise do not perceive positively (such as Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam), while it is also notable that Russia is perceived more similarly than many Asian countries – although less than Singapore and North Korea (see *Figure 7*).


Figure 7: How similar are the following countries and China in regard to cultural values?



3 First associations with Russia and the US

The survey asked open-ended questions inviting respondents to share their first associations with the US and Russia. *Figure 8* shows that the **United States was commonly thought of as an advanced and powerful state, yet hostile to China, untrustworthy, and having a tendency to interfere in other countries' affairs.** "Hegemon" was the most prevalent association (70 out of 500) that appeared among the responses, followed by "advanced technology," "bossy," "developed economy," "powerful," and "war." Furthermore, "Covid-19" was also a frequently mentioned association with America, following right after "war." It is not clear from the results precisely what the respondents meant by mentioning the virus. It might be a simple reference to how the pandemic was handled in the US. But it could also be a consequence of exposure to conspiracy theories claiming the US was the source or even manufacturer of the coronavirus that Chinese party-state spokespersons and social media accounts have endorsed.

Figure 8: What first comes to mind when you think of the US?¹⁹



When it came to Russia, the first associations were mostly positive, although the intensity of positivity did not appear as strong as the negativity towards the US. As illustrated in *Figure 9*, many associations seemed to be based upon stereotypes, such as “vodka,” “beautiful girls,” “bears,” and adjectives such as “vast” and “cold” appeared about 25 times each. The

most frequently mentioned term was the popular online descriptor “warrior nation” (more than 80 mentions out of 500), and while “war with Ukraine” was recorded in the responses, it did not appear to have either a negative or positive tone (only one single response mentioned that “Russia attacked Ukraine” and a few respondents referred to an “invasion,” without further details).

Figure 9: What first comes to mind when you think of Russia?²⁰




An interesting comparison with the US may be that “Putin” as the Russian leader seems much more central to Chinese images of Russia than the US leaders are to the image of the US. The current US President Joe Biden received about half the amount of mentions compared to his predecessor Donald Trump, but neither was mentioned very frequently. Putin’s name, meanwhile, was the second most frequent association with Russia for Chinese respondents. In contrast to the US, Russia is clearly viewed as a friendly country, but the prevalence of stereotypes, including negative ones, may also suggest this friendliness does not have very deep social roots and is driven by a pragmatic recognition of the exigencies of state-to-state relations, along with the persona of the current Russian leader.

4 Faces of Chinese attitudes towards main powers


Chinese propaganda images of Russia and the West also appear to translate – at least at the time of data collection – into more specific forms of attractiveness. For instance, among the foreign countries, **Russia was the top desired location to visit for more than 58% of the respondents, followed by Singapore (56%) and Japan (46%)** (see *Figure 10*). On the contrary, the **US was one of the least desired travel destinations** with 49% of respondents indicating they would not visit. By far the least appealing places to travel for the respondents were India and Vietnam, with 64% and 52% of respondents stating they did not wish to travel there respectively.

Figure 10: If there is no pandemic, to what extent do you want to visit the following places as a tourist?²¹




Russia also appeared to be one of the most recommended countries for pursuing higher education among the Chinese, behind only China itself (83%), Singapore (56%), and the United Kingdom (55%). More than 52% of respondents recommended university study in Russia (see *Figure 11*), while India and South Korea were the least recommended countries for university studies, with 63% and 42% of respondents not recommending them respectively.

Figure 11: If there is no pandemic, to what extent do you recommend a university student to study in the following places?²²



The general confidence in Russia and disaffection towards the US was also visible in respondents' answers to a question on how friendly the people would be in given countries when travelling. Aside from China, most respondents said they expected Russian people would be friendly (71%) towards them, significantly ahead of Singaporeans (60%) and North Koreans (57%). Indians and Americans were expected to be the least friendly, with 49% and 47% of respondents thinking they would be very or somewhat unfriendly (see *Figure 12*). These findings suggest **Chinese people's attitudes towards Russia and the US are spilling over from matters of government policy into broader societal issues and expectations.**


Figure 12: If you travel in the following places, to what extent do you think local people there are friendly to you?



5 Covid-19 vaccines and diplomacy

Only **30% of Chinese respondents** claimed that they would be willing to be immunized with the European and American vaccines respectively, whereas 50% were clearly reluctant. By contrast, respondents expressed considerably **higher trust in Russian vaccines** than in the vaccines produced by Western countries. While the overwhelming majority of respondents said they would be willing to receive a domestic vaccine (almost 93%), Russia ranked second, albeit with a significantly smaller proportion (41%) indicating trust (see *Figure 13*). More than 69% of respondents would not be willing to get an Indian-made vaccine; only slightly more than 19% would. The results confirm the apparent linkage between foreign policy concerns with various other dimensions of Chinese citizens' attitudes towards foreign countries.²³

Figure 13: How willing would you be to get a vaccine produced by:²⁴



These findings bode ill for China's exit from zero-Covid strategy. If the exit relies in part on importing the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, Beijing faces not only political obstacles such as national pride, but also strong public resistance. In fact, low levels of trust in Western vaccines may be the result of consistent Chinese propaganda narratives describing the West as fabricating vaccine efficacy data – or even covering up vaccine-caused deaths.²⁵


Respondents' perceptions of China's international standing were very optimistic. Our results in this regard seem to confirm the broader trend described by Haifeng Huang²⁶ in which Chinese citizens have shifted their attitudes quite sharply from admiring the West to strong preferences and confidence in their own country.

6 Perceived distribution of power

Economically, China was perceived as the most powerful country, ahead of the US and the EU. In terms of military power, China was seen also as superior to other great powers, slightly ahead of Russia and the US. As for cultural attractiveness, China was seen without question as the most attractive country. Russia was perceived as more culturally attractive than Europe, Japan, and the US.

Almost 90% of respondents evaluated China as economically strong, and more than 83% also viewed the US in the same light (see Figure 14). Russia came in second place, with 71% of respondents rating it as economically strong, and slightly more than 12% as economically weak. Among those polled, India was seen as the least economically powerful country. Only approximately 30% of respondents thought India was economically strong, while more than 42% said it was weak.


Figure 14: How economically powerful or economically weak do you consider these countries/entities?



A similar pattern can be seen in Figure 15 showing the respondents' perception of military power of the six great powers. **China was seen as militarily strong by 90%. Russia and the US were perceived as powerful by a similar proportion, approximately 87% and 86% respectively.** Nevertheless, a plurality (40%) rated the US as "very strong," with slightly more than 40%, compared to about 32% for China and 27% in the case of Russia. On the opposite end of the scale, **India and Japan were seen as having relatively weak military capabilities.** Only 33% of Chinese perceived India as strong and a larger share of respondents rated it as weak (almost 37%). Japan was seen as weak by 18%, a finding seemingly at odds with the ongoing


propaganda lines projecting Japan as a threat. Only 9% of respondents rated the EU as weak.

Figure 15: How militarily powerful or militarily weak do you consider the following countries/entities?



Respondents were also asked to assess the six great powers on how attractive or unattractive their cultures are. **India was by far the least attractive country in the respondents' eyes**, with more than 46% perceiving it as unattractive overall. The US was scored as culturally unattractive by about 26% of the respondents but more than half (53%) viewed it as attractive, despite the foreign policy conflicts with China. A comparable share of respondents, 26% specifically, thought Japan was unattractive, whereas for almost 52% it appeared attractive. The EU was evaluated as having cultural attractiveness by a higher proportion of respondents than Japan, while **Russia was rated as the most attractive foreign country**, with more than 71% of respondents saying it appealed to them. Consistent with other results, China placed first in terms of cultural attractiveness, with only 2% of responses describing it as unattractive (see *Figure 16*).


Figure 16: How attractive or unattractive do you consider the cultures of the following countries/entities?



In relation to the importance of other powers for the economic growth of China, the greatest majority of respondents (79%) said they **considered Russia an important country for the development of the Chinese economy** (see *Figure 17*). That might be surprising at first glance, given that Russia has not been among the top five trading partners for China, unlike the EU, the US, and Japan. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the last two decades have seen a significant increase in economic exchanges between China and Russia and in the context of the discussions of “decoupling” between China and the US, the respondents might have been influenced to exaggerate Russia’s importance to China. This may be another evidence of how propaganda seemed to adjust people’s perception of reality.

The EU was assessed as economically important to China by more than 70% of respondents, the second-highest proportion behind Russia. India was viewed as relatively unimportant to China. The respondents appeared to be divided on the question of its significance, with 35% rating it as unimportant while a comparable proportion of respondents (slightly more than 37%) said it was at least somewhat important for China. Surprisingly, from the respondents’ perspective, **Japan also appeared to be perceived as less important to China**, even though in reality it has been one of China’s top trading partners. Almost 20% of respondents said Japan was unimportant for the development of the Chinese economy, while 56% stated it was important.


Figure 17: How important or unimportant do you consider the following countries/entities for the development of the Chinese economy?



Interestingly, **Russia was also seen as the country with the most influence on China, with nearly 82% of respondents believing it has some level of influence**. Nearly 76% of respondents perceived some level of influence


from the United States, making it a close second ahead of the European Union with 74%. While only 62% of respondents believed Japan has some influence on China, it ranks fourth. Nearly 30% said they believed South Korea had little to no influence despite the prevalence of its popular culture in China such as Korean television serials (see *Figure 18*).

Figure 18: How much influence do these foreign actors have on your country?



When asked about their assessment of each country's influence, 79% of respondents said they believed **Russia's was at least somewhat positive**. The remaining four were viewed far less favourably, with a gap of 35 percentage points between Russia and the European Union, whose influence only 45% of respondents viewed positively. Following the EU is South Korea, with less than 35% favourability. Japan and the United States ranked similarly, with positive views of their influence from 31% and 28% of respondents respectively. Unsurprising, **17% of respondents viewed influence from the United States as very negative while only 5% believed it to be very positive** (see *Figure 19*).


Figure 19: How positive or negative do you find the influence of these foreign actors on your country?



7 Foreign policy preferences


The wide-ranging positive sentiments towards Russia and largely negative perceptions of the US correlate closely with Chinese respondents' foreign policy preferences. This can be observed in *Figure 20*, showing nearly **74% in favour of a friendly policy toward Russia, while more than 61% favour a tough policy toward America**. Significantly lower proportions favour getting tough with Japan (51%) and India (48%). In light of respondents' recognition of the US's economic and military power noted above, this result suggests Chinese citizens' foreign policy preferences – at least towards the great powers – relate more closely to their perceptions of the country's friendliness towards China than power realities or historical grievances such as those against Japan.

Figure 20: For the following countries, to what extent do you think the state should adopt either tough or friendly policies?



When asked what China's foreign policy priorities should be, **respondents seem largely in favour of all the common foreign policy options**. This finding is not surprising given the general bias towards agreement in most survey responses. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that **"protection of China's sovereignty and security" was the most supported option** (with almost 92% of respondents agreeing that this should be a priority) and "aid and assistance to the developing world" the least supported (about 80% agreeing) (see *Figure 21*).


Figure 21: According to your opinion, China's priorities in its foreign policy should be:²⁷



8 Views of Chinese people

One feature of today's Chinese political context is unquestionable support for the One China policy and full control over Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, when asked, respondents did differ in how closely they felt towards other Mainland Chinese, Hongkongers, and Taiwanese (see *Figure 22*). While more than **91% of respondents indicated they felt a sense of “brotherhood” with other Mainland Chinese**, the proportion was **significantly lower when asked about their connection with people from Hong Kong (67%) and Taiwan (approximately 56%)**. Besides, although overseas Chinese are often claimed as “China’s own”, the sense of “brotherhood” with the Chinese diaspora (62%) or foreigners of Chinese origin (42%) was not particularly strong.

Figure 22: To what extent do you feel a strong sense of brotherhood with the following groups?²⁸



Endnotes

- ¹ Turcsanyi, Richard Q., Tao Wang, Peter Gries, Veronika Vasekova, Sophie Xiangqian Yi, Runya Qiaoan, Kristina Kironska, *Sinophone Borderlands Mainland China and Hong Kong Survey*, Palacky University Olomouc, 2022.
- ² Conducting public opinion surveys in Mainland China has its specificities due to the closed nature of the political regime controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Political and information control have tightened significantly since President Xi Jinping entered office in 2012, and especially since China-US relations shifted to a more conflictual form from late 2017. Since Covid-19, China has also significantly restricted international travel. As a result, it has become even more difficult to investigate sentiments towards various international, political, economic, and other issues within China. While it is perhaps more important than ever to understand how China and the Chinese perceive various issues, we should also recognize that the current climate might make Chinese public opinion more unstable and politically constrained than usual. This survey was conducted during the height of attention paid to the Russian-Ukraine war (which started on 24 February 2022), and before the escalation of the Shanghai lockdown (which began on 28 March 2022). This context makes the survey findings highly relevant and thus we have decided to immediately publish a number of our most relevant results in the following report.
- ³ A pilot data collection was conducted on 24–25 February 2022 on a sample of 69 respondents.
- ⁴ The data collection was coordinated by Focus Agency, in cooperation with Cint, Toluna, and Rakutan. The questionnaire consisted of more than 300 data points, including a few open questions, and it took respondents on average about 18–20 minutes to complete. The questions asked about various aspects of attitudes towards foreign countries, consumer and cultural preferences, views about social issues, and basic demographics.
- ⁵ Sinophone Borderlands – Interactions at the Edges main page: www.sinofon.cz.
- ⁶ See our publications at: www.sinofon.cz/surveys.
- ⁷ Klara Dubravcikova, "Chinese Media Watch: Blaming everyone but the Russian military for the killings in Bucha," *Central European Institute of Asian Studies*, April 8, 2022. <https://ceias.eu/chinese-media-watch-bucha-killings/>; "Chinese Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine," *US-China Perception Monitor*, April 19, 2022. <https://uscnpm.org/2022/04/19/chinese-public-opinion-war-in-ukraine/>; Maria Repnikova and Wendy Zhou, "What China's Social Media Is Saying About Ukraine," *The Atlantic*, March 11, 2022. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/china-xi-ukraine-war-america/627028>.
- ⁸ It is also consistent with the U.S.-China Perception Monitor's March 2022 survey which found that 75% of Chinese respondents considered support for Russia in the wake of the invasion to be in China's national interest, and attributed significant credibility to the theory of American biolabs in Ukraine, implicitly linked to COVID-19 outbreak in China. See: Michael Cerny, Haifeng Huang and Yawei Liu, "Chinese Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine," *US-China Perception Monitor*, April 19, 2022. <https://uscnpm.org/2022/04/19/chinese-public-opinion-war-in-ukraine>.
- ⁹ See: Pew Research Center, Global Indicators Database: Chinese favourable views Towards Russia, 2022. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/27/country/cn>.
- ¹⁰ Feelings towards all selected countries have been measured on a 0 (negative) to 100 (positive) scale. The responses were grouped as "negative" (incl. very negative: 0-20 and negative: 21-45), "neutral" (46-54) and "positive" (incl. positive: 55-79 and very positive: 80-100).
- ¹¹ The respondents were split randomly into six groups, about 500 randomly selected respondents were asked about the US, Japan, and Russia, respectively. Remaining three groups of about 500 respondents were asked about Singapore, Europe, and Africa, respectively (the results are not included in this report). Respondents were offered 7 options: much worse; worse; slightly worse; neither worse nor better; slightly better; better; much better. "Worsened" includes options much worse; worse; slightly worse (options 1–3 on a scale between 1 and 7). "Did not change" includes

option neither worse nor better (option 4). “Improved” includes options slightly better; better; much better (options 5–7).

- ¹² Richard Wike and Bruce Stokes, “Chinese Public Sees More Powerful Role in World, Names U.S. as Top Threat,” *Pew Research Center*, October 5, 2016, pp. 20-21.
- ¹³ Supra note 11.
- ¹⁴ Supra note 11.
- ¹⁵ These findings are generally in line with those of Liu, Li and Fang from November 2020 and January–February 2021 who surveyed Chinese people’s views towards the Western countries, see: Adam Y. Liu, Xiaojun Li, and Songying Fang, “What do Chinese People Think of Developed Countries? 2021 Edition,” *The Diplomat*, March 13, 2021. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/what-do-chinese-people-think-of-developed-countries-2021-edition/>.
- ¹⁶ A 2019 survey found 57% of Ukrainian respondents held a positive view of China, and only 14% negative. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “China’s Economic Growth Mostly Welcomed in Emerging Markets, but Neighbors Wary of Its Influence,” *Pew Research Center*, December 5, 2019.
- ¹⁷ Turcsányi, Richard Q., Matej Šimalčík, Renáta Sedláková, Jiří Čeněk, Kristina Kironská, Andrej Findor, Ondrej Buchel, Matej Hruška, Adrian Brona, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Mario Esteban, Beatrice Gallelli, Jelena Gledic, Peter Gries, Sergei Ivanov, Björn Jerdén, Marc Julienne, Tamás Matura, Tim Rühlig, and Tim Summers, “European public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19. Differences and common ground across the continent,” *Palacký University Olomouc*, 2022. <https://sinofon.cz/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/COMP-poll-final.pdf>.
- ¹⁸ Supra note 10.
- ¹⁹ The answers provided by 2 or more respondents are visualized.
- ²⁰ Supra note 19.
- ²¹ Respondents were offered 7 options. “Do not want to visit at all” includes option 1 on a scale between 1 and 7. “Do not want to visit” includes options 2 and 3. “Neutral” includes option 4. “Want to visit” includes options 5 and 6. “Want to visit a lot” includes option 7.
- ²² Respondents were offered 7 options. “Do not recommend at all” includes option 1 on a scale between 1 and 7. “Do not recommend” includes options 2 and 3. “Neutral” includes option 4. “Recommend” includes options 5 and 6. “Highly recommend” includes option 7.
- ²³ A similar finding in terms of the vaccine was also discovered by another public opinion survey by YouGov. See: Matthew Smith, “How much difference does it make to people where a COVID vaccine was developed?” *YouGov*, January 15, 2022. <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-reports/2021/01/15/how-much-difference-does-it-make-people-where-covi>.
- ²⁴ Respondents were offered 7 options. “Not willing at all” includes option 1 on a scale between 1 and 7. “Not willing” includes options 2 and 3. “Neutral” includes option 4. “Willing” includes options 5 and 6. “Very willing” includes option 7.
- ²⁵ The Carter Center’s US-China Perceptions Monitor survey in 2022 showed significant belief in this conspiracy theory, especially among more educated respondents, and those who consume more state media and social media. See: Michael Cerny, Haifeng Huang and Yawei Liu, “Chinese Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine,” *US-China Perception Monitor*, April 19, 2022. <https://uscnpm.org/2022/04/19/chinese-public-opinion-war-in-ukraine/>.

- ²⁶ Haifeng Huang, "From 'The Moon Is Rounder Abroad' to 'Bravo, My Country': How China Misperceives the World," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, February 15, 2021. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-021-09322-z>.
- ²⁷ Desired foreign policy areas have been measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. The chart shows the proportion of respondents who selected options 5 (somewhat agree), 6 (agree), and 7 (strongly agree).
- ²⁸ The option "Foreigners of Chinese origin" (外籍华人) refers to persons of Chinese origin having foreign citizenship. "Chinese diaspora" (旅居海外的中国人) refers to Chinese people residing outside China.

About authors

RICHARD Q. TURCSÁNYI | Program Director, CEIAS | Key Researcher, Sinophone Borderlands, Palacký University Olomouc | Assistant Professor, Mendel University Brno



turcsanyi@ceias.eu



@RQTurcsanyi

KLÁRA DUBRAVČÍKOVÁ | Research Fellow, CEIAS



dubravcikova@ceias.eu

KRISTÍNA KIRONSKÁ | Advocacy Director, CEIAS | Senior Researcher, Sinophone Borderlands, Palacký University Olomouc



kironska@ceias.eu



@KristinaKi6

TAO WANG | Research Associate, Manchester China Institute



tao.wang-8@
postgrad.manchester.ac.uk



@TaoManchester

JAMES IOCOVOZZI | Research Assistant, CEIAS



jamesvozzi@gmail.com

PETER GRIES | Director, Manchester China Institute | Lee Kai Hung Chair



peter.gries@manchester.ac.uk



@PeterHaysGries

VERONIKA VASEKOVÁ | Research Assistant, Palacký University Olomouc



veronika.vasekova01@upol.cz

ANDREW CHUBB | British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, Lancaster University



a.chubb@lancaster.ac.uk



@zhubochubo

About CEIAS

The Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) is an independent think tank based in Bratislava (Slovakia), and with branches in Olomouc (Czech Republic), and Vienna (Austria).

The main goal of CEIAS is to spread knowledge about Asia among scholars and experts in Central Europe and beyond, while also informing the public about Central European activities in Asia.

To this end, CEIAS conducts and publishes its research, organizes public seminars and conferences, supports education on Asian topics, and communicates with the local, regional, and international media.

CEIAS activities focus mainly on international relations and security studies in East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. CEIAS cooperates with a number of experts and similar organizations in the region and beyond.

Connect with us online:



<https://www.facebook.com/CEIASeu/>



https://twitter.com/CEIAS_eu



https://www.instagram.com/ceias_eu/



<https://www.linkedin.com/company/ceias-eu/>



<https://www.ceias.eu>



office@ceias.eu

About Sinophone Borderlands

The Sinophone Borderlands – Interaction at the Edges is an excellent research project based at the Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic. The project is funded by the European Regional Development Fund, project no. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000791.

The main idea of the project is to explore how the Chinese-speaking world interacts with other worlds, including those at its border (Slavophone, Tibetophone, Turco-Persophone, or Austroasiatophone worlds), as well as those who may be more distant (such as Anglophone, Hispanophone, Francophone, and others).

The Sinophone Borderlands research team consists of researchers from various disciplines under three main Research Groups - Political Science, Anthropology, and Linguistics. This allows for a cross-disciplinary dialogue and cross-cultural comparisons which pushes the academic studies of China and Asia beyond the limits of current disciplinary and national frameworks.

The Sinophone Borderlands is a research project that engages primarily in activities such as publishing academic journal articles, books, or participating in conferences and workshops.

Connect with us online:



<https://www.facebook.com/SinophoneBorderlands>



<https://twitter.com/SinophoneE>



<https://www.sinofon.cz>



sinofon@upol.cz

Chinese views of the world at the time of the Russia-Ukraine war: Evidence from a March 2022 public opinion survey

Authors: Richard Q. Turcsányi, Klára Dubravčíková, Kristína Kironská, Tao Wang, James Iocovozzi, Peter Gries, Veronika Vaseková, Andrew Chubb

Editor: Richard Q. Turcsányi

Layout and cover design: Klára Dubravčíková, Matej Šimalčík

Unauthorized use of the work is a breach of copyright and may be subject to civil, administrative, or criminal liability.

Published by:

Palacký University Olomouc
Křížkovského 8, 771 47 Olomouc, Czechia
www.vydavatelstvi.upol.cz
www.e-shop.upol.cz
vup@upol.cz

Central European Institute of Asian Studies
Murgašova 2, 811 04 Bratislava, Slovakia
www.ceias.eu
office@ceias.eu

© Authors

© Palacký University Olomouc, 2022

© Central European Institute of Asian Studies, 2022

ISBN: --- (UPOL)

ISBN: 978-80-8239-007-3 (CEIAS)



ISBN --- (UPOL)
ISBN 978-80-8239-007-3 (CEIAS)